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The creation of the Monnet Plan, 1945-46: a critical re-evaluation 
 
The Plan de modernisation et d’équipement (PME, Plan for Modernisation and 
Equipment) – better known as the Monnet Plan – was a central feature of economic statecraft 
in post-war France.  This national economic plan was directed by Jean Monnet through the 
Commissariat général du Plan (CGP, Commissariat for the Plan), an office established in 
January 1946, with the first five-year plan beginning one year later.  Guided by Monnet’s 
famous maxim of ‘modernisation or decadence’, the PME contributed to the economic reviv-
al of post-war France known as the Trente glorieuses. 
 
Given the importance of the PME in French economic history, and Monnet’s central 
role in bringing about European integration by drafting the Schuman Plan in 1950, the Mon-
net Plan has long been a popular topic amongst historians.  Many of the most important stud-
ies of the Monnet Plan focus on the domestic economic situation in France in the 1940s, 
while neglecting the specific political environment in which the PME was developed.1  Oth-
ers have taken a broader view by looking at the international economy, explaining how the 
development of the PME was driven by France’s dependence on financial support from the 
United States in the early post-war years as well as by economic considerations behind 
France’s policies towards occupied Germany.2  This more international approach has been 
applied to analyse political factors as well, notably how the emerging Cold War shaped 
French domestic policies and convinced the United States to support the economic recovery 
of Western Europe.3  In addition, biographical studies of Jean Monnet have sought to explain 
                                                
1	  Two	  studies	  that	  situate	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Monnet	  Plan	  in	  the	  broader	  economic	  
history	  of	  France	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  are	  Richard	  Kuisel,	  Capitalism	  and	  the	  State	  in	  
Modern	  France.	  Renovation	  and	  Economic	  Management	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  (Cam-­‐
bridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1981)	  and	  Michel	  Margairaz,	  L’Etat,	  les	  finances	  et	  
l’économie.	  Histoire	  d’une	  conversion,	  1932-­‐1952	  (Paris:	  CHEFF,	  1991).	  	  A	  more	  thorough	  
study	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Monnet	  Plan	  is	  provided	  in	  Philippe	  Mioche,	  Le	  Plan	  Mon-­‐
net.	  Genèse	  et	  élaboration	  1941-­‐1947	  (Paris:	  Publications	  de	  la	  Sorbonne	  1987).	  
2	  Alan	  Milward,	  The	  Reconstruction	  of	  Western	  Europe,	  1945-­‐51	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1984);	  
Gérard	  Bossuat,	  L’Europe	  occidentale	  à	  l’heure	  américaine,	  1944-­‐1952	  	  (Brussels:	  Complexe,	  
1992);	  Frances	  Lynch,	  France	  and	  the	  International	  Economy.	  From	  Vichy	  to	  the	  Treaty	  of	  
Rome	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1997).	  
3	  Irwin	  Wall,	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Postwar	  France	  1945-­‐1954	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991);	  William	  Hitchcock,	  France	  Restored.	  Cold	  War	  Diplomacy	  
 
2	  
the development of the PME by analysing Monnet’s own experiences, methods, and net-
works.4   
 
Despite the divergent approaches employed in the rich literature on the Monnet Plan, 
there is broad consensus on three important points.  The first is that attempts at developing a 
national economic plan – an idea with roots in the Vichy years – were abandoned by the Min-
istry for the National Economy in the spring of 1945 and that Monnet’s proposals for the 
PME at the end of that year encountered little in the way of opposition or institutional rival-
ries – in Monnet’s own words, ‘I took nobody’s place’.5  The second point of consensus has 
to do with the position of the CGP within the French administration.  In an unprecedented 
decision, the CGP was placed beyond the reach of any ministry and made answerable directly 
to the executive,6 in what we may call a supra-ministerial structure.  Historians have accept-
ed Monnet’s explanation that this radical arrangement was devised simply for the sake of 
efficiency: to facilitate the drawing up of a wide-ranging plan for the national economy, the 
CGP was a small, nimble office independent of the relevant ministries with what he called 
their ‘administrative ponderousness’.7  The third point relates to how Monnet succeeded in 
improbably securing broad support for the PME.  Historians agree that Monnet was a gifted 
consensus builder, which is identified as the key to the success of his initatives.  This broad 
support, it is held, depended on his treating ‘colleagues and politicians openly and honestly 
and […] not conniv[ing] behind their backs’.8  Long-time Minister for Foreign Affairs Mau-
                                                                                                                                                  
and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Leadership	  in	  Europe,	  1944-­‐1954	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  
Press,	  1998).	  
4	  Pascal	  Fontaine,	  Jean	  Monnet	  l’inspirateur	  (Paris:	  Jacques	  Grancher,	  1988);	  François	  
Duchêne,	  Jean	  Monnet:	  The	  First	  Statesman	  of	  Interdependence	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  
Norton,	  1994);	  Eric	  Roussel,	  Jean	  Monnet	  (Paris:	  Fayard,	  1996);	  Sherrill	  Brown	  Wells,	  Jean	  
Monnet:	  Unconventional	  Statesman	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner,	  2011).	  
5	  Jean	  Monnet,	  Mémoires	  (Paris:	  Fayard,	  1976),	  347.	  	  Translations	  are	  the	  author’s.	  	  On	  
economic	  planning	  under	  Vichy,	  see	  Richard	  Kuisel,	  ‘Vichy	  et	  les	  origines	  de	  la	  planification	  
économique	  (1940-­‐1946)’	  in	  Le	  mouvement	  social,	  no.	  98,	  January-­‐March	  1977,	  77-­‐101	  and	  
Philip	  Nord,	  France’s	  New	  Deal	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  
6	  Under	  the	  Provisional	  Government	  (1944-­‐1946),	  the	  President	  was	  both	  Head	  of	  State	  and	  
Head	  of	  Government.	  	  Under	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Republic,	  approved	  in	  October	  
1946,	  these	  roles	  were	  separated	  and	  the	  CGP	  remained	  accountable	  to	  the	  Head	  of	  Gov-­‐
ernment,	  namely	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Council	  (often	  translated	  as	  ‘Prime	  Minister’).	  
7	  Monnet,	  Mémoires,	  op.cit.,	  347.	  
8	  Wells,	  Jean	  Monnet,	  op.cit.,	  247.	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rice Couve de Murville affirmed that Monnet ‘never tried to deceive people’.9  This gathering 
together of individuals and groups with divergent viewpoints to support the PME through 
‘collective problem solving’ became known as the ‘Monnet method’.   
 
Drawing on an extensive range of French archival sources as well as Jean Monnet’s 
papers in Lausanne, this article interrogates these three points of agreement by focusing on an 
overlooked aspect of the development of the PME, namely the domestic political context of 
1945-46 during which the CGP was established.  While the Monnet Plan was endorsed by all 
major political parties and was presented by Monnet himself as strictly apolitical, this study 
shows how the creation of the Commissariat for the Plan was decisively shaped by the partic-
ular political context of post-war France. This re-evaluation thus provides a more challenging 
understanding of the creation of the Monnet Plan and an important reappraisal of Monnet’s 
celebrated method. 
 
I 
 By the time Allied forces landed in Normandy on 6 June 1944, France’s government-
in-waiting had already developed a broad economic agenda for the country.  The Gouverne-
ment provisoire de la République française (GPRF, Provisional Government of the French 
Republic), created just three days before D-Day, and the Comité français de Libération na-
tionale (CFLN, French Committee for National Liberation) that had preceded it, had dis-
cussed an economic agenda for a post-war French Republic from as early as 1941.  Under the 
leadership of General de Gaulle, however, the Parti communiste français (PCF, French 
Communist Party) was excluded from such discussions until relatively late in the war.  Alt-
hough the PCF made overtures to develop a common programme under the CFLN banner – 
preferring that the French rally behind a programme ‘rather than follow a single man’10 name-
ly de Gaulle – these were rebuffed by the CFLN as being ‘clearly of demagogical inspira-
tion’.11  Only in March 1944 did the Communist and non-Communist Resistance groups 
                                                
9	  Qtd	  in	  Duchêne,	  Jean	  Monnet,	  op.cit.,	  352.	  
10	  ‘Lettre	  du	  Groupe	  des	  27	  Députés	  Communistes	  Français	  à	  Messieurs	  les	  Présidents	  du	  
Comité	  National	  de	  la	  Libération	  Nationale’,	  17	  August	  1943,	  CFLN	  620,	  Archives	  diploma-­‐
tiques	  (MAE),	  La	  Courneuve.	  	  
11	  ‘Note	  à	  l’attention	  de	  M	  Joxe’,	  28	  August	  1943,	  CFLN	  620,	  MAE.	  	  This	  assessment	  was	  
made	  by	  René	  Massigli,	  then	  Commissioner	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  
4	  
agree upon a set of broad economic policies, in the form of the CNR Programme.12  This in-
cluded the nationalisation – referred to euphemistically as the ‘return to the State’	   – of key 
industries and some degree of economic planning for the post-war period.  The latter policy 
was hardly new – studies had been commissioned within the London-based Resistance as 
early as 1941, and a number of abortive plans developed under the Vichy regime were stud-
ied by Monnet and others13 – but the specific policy details of an economic plan were only 
developed after the Liberation of France.  With the PCF’s endorsement of the CNR Pro-
gramme in March 1944, two members of the party were added to the GPRF’s Cabinet: 
François Billoux, responsible for administering eventual liberated territories, and Fernand 
Grenier, named Commissioner for Aviation.  While 1944 would see the inclusion of the PCF 
in France’s governing coalition, de Gaulle ensured that the key political and economic portfo-
lios were maintained by non-Communist deputies.  
 Indeed, the most significant clash within the GPRF regarding the role of economic 
planning emerged between two left-leaning but indisputably republican figures: the Minister 
for the National Economy, Pierre Mendès France, and the liberal René	   Pleven, then Minister 
for Finance.  Mendès France argued that strict economic planning, involving careful control 
of raw materials, labour, and investment, along with a reduction of the money supply in 
France to fight inflation, was needed to drastically increase production following four disas-
trous years of occupation.  Pleven and other liberal-minded members of Cabinet dismissed 
such controls and instead argued that market forces and international borrowing would re-
store France’s economy.  Characteristically, President de Gaulle was uninterested in such 
economic questions and intervened only hesitantly and belatedly.  While many historians 
agree that Mendès France’s approach made more sense economically, de Gaulle’s decision 
was essentially political: after the hardships of defeat and occupation in the Second World 
War, de Gaulle scarcely wanted to impose harsh and inevitably unpopular measures while he 
was trying to consolidate his own power.  In this goal de Gaulle was initially successful, alt-
hough his choice of Pleven’s approach led to the resignation of Mendès France in March 
                                                
12	  The	  best	  study	  of	  the	  Programme	  of	  the	  Conseil	  national	  de	  la	  Résistance	  (CNR,	  National	  
Council	  for	  the	  Resistance)	  remains	  Claire	  Andrieu,	  Le	  programme	  commun	  de	  la	  Résistance.	  
Des	  idées	  dans	  la	  guerre	  (Paris:	  Editions	  de	  l’Erudit,	  1984).	  	  See	  also	  Isser	  Woloch,	  ‘Left,	  right	  
and	  centre:	  the	  MRP	  and	  the	  post-­‐war	  moment’	  in	  French	  History	  21:1,	  2007,	  85-­‐106.	  
5	  
1945 and years of rampant inflation in post-war France.14  Following the latter’s departure,  a 
consensus emerged within the Provisional Government that strict economic controls and re-
strictive allocations of raw materials were to be avoided, leaving market forces a much freer 
hand to shape the nation’s economy, yet overall production and investment were to be di-
rected by the State.   
The disagreement between Mendès France and Pleven over the degree of State in-
volvement in economic planning did not, however, alter the agreement on where in the 
French administration the Plan would be based.  In November 1944, de Gaulle had issued a 
decree conferring the responsibility of drawing up and executing a national economic plan to 
the Minister for the National Economy, then Mendès France.  The literature on this period 
generally identifies Mendès France’s resignation the following March as ‘the end of his re-
newed attempt to set up… a national plan’ under the Ministry for the National Economy and 
that when he resigned, ‘the prospects of his plan went with him’.15  Instead, a new figure 
emerged who would take on the responsibility of crafting an ambitious plan: Jean Monnet.  
From his humble origins as a cognac salesman, Monnet had risen to hold important positions 
as Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations and later President of the Anglo-
French Co-ordination Committee, responsible for coordinating the economic war effort of the 
Allies in the first months of the Second World War.  Moving on to the United States after the 
Fall of France, he played a crucial role in the development of the American Victory Program 
and later joined the CFLN, although he initially backed de Gaulle’s rival, General Giraud, as 
leader of the organisation.  His involvement in economic planning only seems to have started 
at the end of August 1945, with a meeting between Monnet and de Gaulle in Washington.  
According to his memoirs, Monnet told de Gaulle that France needed to modernise its econ-
omy and become more productive if the country hoped to maintain its place as a great power, 
                                                                                                                                                  
13	  For	  the	  origins	  of	  economic	  planning	  in	  France,	  see	  Mioche,	  Le	  Plan	  Monnet,	  op.cit.;	  Mar-­‐
gairaz,	  L’Etat,	  les	  finances	  et	  l’économie,	  op.cit.;	  Richard	  Kuisel,	  ‘Vichy	  et	  les	  origines	  de	  la	  
planification	  économique,	  1940-­‐1946’,	  op.cit.;	  and	  Philip	  Nord,	  France’s	  New	  Deal,	  op.cit.	  
14	  See	  Hitchcock,	  op.cit.,	  25-­‐29	  and	  Kuisel,	  Capitalism	  and	  the	  State,	  198.	  
15	  Frances	  Lynch,	  ‘Resolving	  the	  Paradox	  of	  the	  Monnet	  Plan:	  National	  and	  International	  
Planning	  in	  French	  Reconstruction’,	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  vol.	  37,	  no.	  2,	  May	  1984,	  pp.	  
229-­‐243,	  234	  and	  François	  Duchêne,	  Jean	  Monnet:	  The	  First	  Statesman	  of	  Interdependence	  
(London	  and	  New	  York:	  Norton,	  1994),	  149.	  	  Similar	  arguments	  are	  made	  by	  Kuisel,	  Capital-­‐
ism	  and	  the	  State,	  op.cit.,	  228;	  Eric	  Roussel,	  Jean	  Monnet	  (Paris:	  Fayard,	  1996),	  434-­‐6;	  and	  
Hitchcock,	  France	  Restored,	  op.cit.,	  28-­‐29.	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to which de Gaulle apparently replied: ‘You are certainly right. Would you care to try?’.16  
Importantly, at this stage Monnet focused on the need to attract American dollars to buttress 
the French economy, and his efforts were focused in this direction.17   
The literature on the PME presents a smooth transition from Mendès France’s resig-
nation in March to Monnet’s gradual involvement in economic planning from August that 
year.  As Monnet recalls in his memoirs, ‘I took nobody’s place’.18  Yet this overlooks the 
fact that responsibility for economic planning remained with the ministry far longer than 
Mendès France did.  With Pleven taking over the portfolio from March 1945, he became the 
minister responsible for drawing up a national plan.  This arrangement was maintained in 
July 1945, when it was agreed that a Directorate for the Plan would be established within the 
ministry. Gaston Cusin, the ministry’s top civil servant, oversaw the reorganisation of the 
ministry to accommodate the new Directorate, which would constitute one of its key branch-
es.19  Discussions over how the plan should be constructed continued over the summer, and 
on 28 September René	  Pleven confirmed that the organisation of the Ministry for the Nation-
al Economy ‘must be perceptibly simplified [by] grouping [the ministry’s] services into four 
Directorates’, with the ‘Directorate for the Plan’ first among them.  Interestingly, Jean Mon-
net’s name was never mentioned as a possible Director.20  By the end of September 1945, 
then, it seemed clear that France’s market-friendly plan would be overseen by the Minister 
for the National Economy, not Monnet.  By January 1946, however, Monnet was at the head 
of a Commissariat for the Plan which stood outside of any ministry, and answered directly to 
the President of the Republic.  To understand this fundamental change involving the creation 
of a supra-ministerial Commissariat for the Plan headed by Monnet, it is necessary to exam-
ine the political context of early post-war France and the tensions that existed under de 
Gaulle’s presidency of the Provisional Government.  
                                                
16	  Monnet,	  Mémoires,	  op.cit.,	  328.	  	  This	  episode	  is	  faithfully	  recounted	  in	  much	  of	  the	  litera-­‐
ture;	  cf.	  Duchêne,	  Jean	  Monnet,	  op.cit.,	  145	  and	  Roussel,	  Jean	  Monnet,	  op.cit.,	  427.	  
17	  Gérard	  Bossuat,	  L’Europe	  occidentale	  à	  l’heure	  américaine,	  1944-­‐1952	  (Brussels:	  Com-­‐
plexe,	  1992).	  
18	  Monnet,	  Mémoires,	  op.cit.,	  347.	  
19	  ‘Note	  pour	  le	  Colonel	  Vallon’	  by	  Cusin,	  2	  July	  1945,	  3	  AG	  4	  25,	  Archives	  nationales	  (AN),	  
Paris.	  
20	  ‘Communication	  du	  Ministre	  de	  l’Economie	  Nationale	  sur	  la	  réorganisation	  des	  Services	  
du	  Ministère	  de	  l’Economie	  Nationale’,	  28	  September	  1945,	  F	  60	  900,	  AN.	  
7	  
  
II 
The most significant domestic political event of the latter half of 1945 was the first 
general legislative elections in post-war France, which took place in October.  These historic 
elections – the first in which French women could vote – saw the Communist Party take the 
largest share of the vote, winning 26.2% of the ballot and 159 seats.21  Given the results, PCF 
leader Maurice Thorez demanded for his party at least one of what they perceived to be the 
three most important portfolios: Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and the Interior.  Presi-
dent de Gaulle had succeeded in denying PCF members key portfolios in the GPRF, but fol-
lowing the party’s electoral victory this would be far more difficult.  Nevertheless, he flatly 
refused Thorez’s demands when constructing a tripartite government of PCF, Socialist 
(SFIO) and Christian Democratic (MRP) ministers.  He justified his choice in a radio address, 
claiming that he could not surrender to the Communists control of any of ‘the three levers 
that control [France’s] foreign policy: the diplomacy that expresses it, the army that supports 
it, the police that covers it’.22  Indeed, in a number of other European countries, such as Po-
land and Hungary, the local Communist Party’s ability to enter into a governing coalition and 
gain control over ministries such as the Interior – and thereby the state police – is often cited 
as the first step of the establishment of a Communist regime.23  De Gaulle instead offered to 
the PCF portfolios that he considered of secondary importance: what he tellingly referred to 
in his memoirs as ‘merely the “economic”	  ministries’.24    In the end, the PCF was given con-
                                                
21	  Of	  the	  586	  seats	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly,	  150	  were	  won	  by	  the	  Christian	  Democrats	  
(MRP,	  Mouvement	  républicain	  populaire)	  and	  146	  by	  the	  Socialists	  (SFIO,	  Section	  française	  
de	  l’Internationale	  ouvrière).	  
22	  Charles	  de	  Gaulle,	  ‘Allocution	  à	  la	  radio,	  le	  17	  novembre	  1945’	  in	  Mémoires	  de	  guerre.	  Le	  
salut:	  1944-­‐1946	  (Paris:	  Plon,	  1959),	  517.	  
23	  The	  classic	  formulation	  of	  this	  argument	  describes	  how	  the	  Communist	  Party	  seizes	  con-­‐
trol	  of	  the	  ‘major	  instruments	  of	  power’	  such	  as	  the	  Ministry	  for	  the	  Interior	  and	  subse-­‐
quently	  sets	  up	  a	  powerful	  secret	  police	  that	  allows	  the	  Party	  to	  remodel	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  State	  along	  the	  Soviet	  model.	  	  This	  was	  first	  advanced	  in	  Carl	  J.	  Friedrich	  and	  Zbigniew	  K.	  
Brezinski,	  Totalitarian	  Dictatorship	  and	  Autocracy	  (New	  York:	  Praeger,	  1956),	  296-­‐7	  and	  has	  
more	  recently	  been	  reiterated	  in	  Anne	  Applebaum,	  Iron	  Curtain:	  The	  Crushing	  of	  Eastern	  
Europe	  1944-­‐1956	  (London:	  Allen	  Lane,	  2012).	  	  For	  a	  revisionist	  interpretation,	  see	  Molly	  
Pucci,	  Security	  Empire:	  Building	  the	  Secret	  Police	  in	  Communist	  Eastern	  Europe,	  1944-­‐1952.	  	  
PhD	  thesis	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University,	  2015).	  
24	  De	  Gaulle,	  Mémoires	  de	  guerre.	  Le	  salut,	  op.cit.,	  327.	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trol of four ministries, the same number as the SFIO and the MRP.25  In the first elected gov-
ernment of post-war France, Communist members were thus named as Ministers for the Na-
tional Economy, Labour, Armaments Production, and Industrial Production; in addition, 
Maurice Thorez was named one of four Ministers of State without a portfolio, raising the 
total number of Communist members of government to five.  The Ministry for Finance, 
meanwhile, remained firmly in the hands of René	   Pleven.  With characteristic modesty, de 
Gaulle appointed himself Minister for Defence, while naming Christian Democrat Georges 
Bidault Foreign Minister and Socialist Adrien Tixier Minister for the Interior.  Despite the 
PCF’s victory in the first post-war legislative elections, de Gaulle managed to limit the fruits 
of this mandate by ensuring that the ‘three levers that control [France’s] foreign policy’ re-
mained firmly in republican rather than Communist hands.26 
Although unsuccessful in securing the most prestigious ministries, the PCF nonethe-
less tried to make the most of the economic portfolios they had dismissively been given by de 
Gaulle.  In the Ministry for Industrial Production, CFLN veteran Robert Lacoste was replaced 
by Marcel Paul.  The outcome of the October 1945 elections initially paralysed important 
ministries such as this one; as the various parties wrangled to allot portfolios in the emerging 
coalition government, ministries were unable to make decisions without knowing whom their 
minister would be.  Lambert Blum-Picard, who had worked with Lacoste in Algiers during 
the war and then served as Secretary General for Industrial Production after the Liberation, 
kept his position as the chief mandarin in the ministry.  Nevertheless, he had to postpone 
even relatively mundane decisions until Lacoste’s successor was named.  At the end of Octo-
ber, for example, he received a proposal to dissolve the Comité d’organisation du sel, a body 
created by the Vichy regime and which was seen to be both unpopular and inefficient.  While 
                                                
25	  These	  three	  parties	  ruled	  in	  a	  tripartite	  coalition	  from	  1944	  until	  May	  1947,	  when	  the	  
Communist	  ministers	  were	  expelled	  from	  government,	  a	  development	  commonly	  associat-­‐
ed	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  France.	  	  See	  Philippe	  Buton,	  ‘L’éviction	  des	  ministres	  
communistes’	  in	  Serge	  Berstein	  and	  Pierre	  Milza	  (eds),	  L’Année	  1947	  (Paris:	  Presses	  de	  
Sciences	  Po,	  2000).	  
26	  François	  Billoux	  claimed	  that	  the	  Armaments	  portfolio	  was	  ‘one	  of	  the	  Defence	  ministries’	  
and	  that	  appointing	  a	  PCF	  member	  to	  this	  amounted	  to	  ‘de	  Gaulle	  back[ing]	  down’.	   	   In	  his	  
detailed	  study	  of	  the	  PCF	  during	  this	  period,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  Philippe	  Buton	  confirms	  that	  
the	  party’s	   inability	   to	   secure	  one	  of	   these	   three	  portfolios	   amounted	   to	  a	   failure	   for	   the	  
PCF.	  	  See	  Billoux,	  Quand	  nous	  étions	  ministres	  (Paris:	  Editions	  sociales,	  1972),	  66-­‐67	  and	  Bu-­‐
ton,	   Les	   lendemains	   qui	   déchantent.	   Le	   Parti	   communiste	   français	   à	   la	   Libération	   (Paris:	  
FNSP,	  1993),	  206-­‐211.	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Blum-Picard agreed that this particular committee should be dismantled, the decision was 
postponed ‘until the general policies of the future government with regard to professional 
organisation have been decided upon’.27  Expecting a change of some importance with the 
impending arrival of a minister with a very different political agenda, the ministry was unable 
to continue the route it had charted for itself following the Liberation.  This state of uncer-
tainty was dissipated on 21 November with the appointment of Marcel Paul as Lacoste’s suc-
cessor.28  
That same day, François Billoux was named Minister for the National Economy.  As 
we have seen, Billoux had been one of the first two PCF members to be included in the Pro-
visional Government in 1944, although his responsibilities at that time had been limited to 
overseeing newly-liberated territories in France following D-Day.  Earlier in 1945 Billoux 
and the only other PCF member in Cabinet, Charles Tillon, had clashed with a number of 
ministers regarding the scope of the post-war épuration of the nation’s industrialists.  De 
Gaulle was eager to avoid dividing France through comprehensive purges of collaborators 
below the highest levels of government, and technocrats such as Monnet recognised that the 
fastest way to revive French industry would be to leave the most experienced industrialists in 
place, regardless of wartime indiscretions.  For the PCF, this approach was unacceptable, as it 
rewarded the employers who had supported the Vichy regime and fuelled the Nazi war econ-
omy.29  In March 1945, Billoux demanded that ‘the priority must be the confiscation of the 
goods of the numerous traitors among the directors of trusts’, adding that the nationalisation 
of French industries had to serve ‘the interests of the State [rather than] the private interests 
of capitalists’.30  Given the PCF’s intransigent position, the appointment of Billoux and Paul 
to the ministries most closely tied to the development of a national economic plan exacerbat-
ed the complexity of questions regarding the future of French industry. 
 
                                                
27	  ‘Note.	  	  Objet:	  Dissolution	  du	  CO	  du	  sel’,	  31	  October	  1945,	  F	  12	  10028,	  AN.	  
28	  Paul	  ultimately	  dissolved	  all	  remaining	  Comités	  d’organisation	  and	  related	  Vichy-­‐era	  in-­‐
dustrial	  bodies	  in	  April	  1946.	  
29	  On	  the	  épuration	  during	  this	  period	  see	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Cointet’s	  Expier	  Vichy:	  l’épuration	  en	  
France	  1943-­‐1958	  (Paris:	  Perrin,	  2008)	  and	  Marc	  Bergère,	  ed.,	  L’épuration	  économique	  en	  
France	  à	  la	  Libération	  (Rennes:	  Presses	  universiatires	  de	  Rennes,	  2008).	  	  
30	  ‘Note	  de	  MM	  Billoux	  et	  Tillon	  sur	  les	  projets	  de	  nationalisation	  soumis	  par	  Monsieur	  le	  
Ministre	  de	  l’Economie	  Nationale’,	  3	  March	  1945,	  3	  AG	  4	  26,	  AN.	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III 
The very next day after the appointment of Billoux and Paul, a memorandum was is-
sued to the Cabinet by de Gaulle’s chef de cabinet, Gaston Palewski.  It specified that ‘a plan 
for the equipment and modernisation of the French Economy will be established’	   and that 
‘this plan, along with the means of assuring its implementation, will be examined, discussed, 
and presented to the Government […] in the next six months’.31  It seemed that any steps to-
wards establishing such a plan would be taken in accordance with the Cabinet, notably those 
holding the crucial economic portfolios.  Less than two weeks later, on 4 December, Jean 
Monnet submitted a proposal to de Gaulle for the PME. The text made the case for using the 
context of post-war reconstruction to effect a rapid modernisation of French industry.  This 
would facilitate an increase of domestic consumption, but more importantly allow France to 
pay for its imports of raw materials –	  particularly coal –	  by increasing its exports of industrial 
products.32  Given the failure of Mendès France’s attempts to establish a plan earlier that 
year, it is worth asking how Monnet managed to convince the French Cabinet, which ran the 
gamut from Gaullists and Christian Democrats to Socialists and Communists, to endorse his 
plan.  While Monnet is often credited with being a successful consensus builder, the different 
arguments he used to win over disparate groups with often contradictory interests in this case 
have not previously been examined.  
Eager to secure de Gaulle’s backing, Monnet framed the project in terms certain to 
appeal to the General, reinforcing some of the themes he had first raised with de Gaulle in 
August.  According to Monnet, only his plan could strengthen France’s economic clout, 
which was the precondition for France being able to play a decisive role in international pow-
er politics.  He warned that if France failed to embrace such a rapid modernisation the coun-
try would ‘be reduced to the rank of a second-rate power’.33   While de Gaulle tended to treat 
economic questions as matters of secondary importance – evident by his choice to dis-
missively leave the ‘mere’	   economic portfolios to PCF members – Monnet crafted his pro-
posal to appeal to de Gaulle’s famous obsession with France’s grandeur.  Given the series of 
                                                
31	  ‘Memorandum’,	  22	  November	  1945,	  3	  AG	  4	  25,	  AN.	  
32	  On	  the	  strategy	  behind	  the	  PME,	  see	  Frances	  Lynch,	  France	  and	  the	  International	  Econo-­‐
my,	  op.cit.	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diplomatic defeats de Gaulle had experienced that year – from being excluded from the cru-
cial Yalta Conference to being overruled by the Allies regarding France’s German policy34 – 
Monnet’s plan to strengthen France’s international position was well-timed.  
While this strategy of modernising French industry to ensure its international position 
had been raised by Monnet in his meeting with de Gaulle in August, an important innovation 
had been added by December.  While it was understood in the summer of 1945 that any na-
tional economic plan would be based in the Ministry for the National Economy, in December 
Monnet proposed the creation of a supra-ministerial CGP that would stand outside of any 
ministry.  This was an unprecedented innovation in the French administration and, signifi-
cantly, no hint of such an arrangement is detectable prior to the October 1945 elections.  Ac-
cording to Gaston Palewski, this arrangement was the direct result of having appointed mem-
bers of the PCF to the key economic portfolios, including the Ministry for the National Econ-
omy.35  Indeed, by December 1945, the early actions of the Communist ministers responsible 
for the French economy were causing increasing alarm among the rest of the Cabinet.  
Palewski briefed de Gaulle on how Marcel Paul was creating myriad commissions to control 
different branches of French industry, with PCF representatives of the minister attending eve-
ry single meeting.  More troubling still, Paul insisted that any industrialist or businessperson 
appealing to the ministry had to ‘include a CV including the political orientation’	   of the indi-
vidual, which would influence the outcome of his or her request – a particularly troubling 
development given how few patrons were Communists.36  This politicisation of the Ministry 
for Industrial Production coincided with de Gaulle’s growing wariness of party politics in 
general.  In June 1946, de Gaulle famously set out his vision of the ideal Constitution for 
France, in which executive power would reside in ‘the Head of State, placed above political 
                                                                                                                                                  
33	  ‘Mémorandum	  sur	  le	  Plan	  de	  Modernisation	  et	  d’Equipement’,	  13	  December	  1945,	  AJ	  80	  
1,	  AN.	  	  The	  first	  version	  of	  this	  memorandum	  was	  presented	  to	  de	  Gaulle	  on	  4	  December	  
1945.	  
34	  See	  Andrew	  Shennan,	  De	  Gaulle	  (London:	  Longman,	  1993),	  49-­‐50.	  
35	  Fondation	  nationale	  des	  sciences	  politiques,	  La	  France	  en	  voie	  de	  modernisation,	  1944-­‐
1952	  (Paris,	  FNSP,	  1981).	  	  Palewski’s	  comments	  at	  this	  conference	  have	  occasionally	  been	  
noted	  in	  subsequent	  studies,	  but	  his	  claim	  has	  not	  been	  investigated.	  	  See	  Philippe	  Mioche,	  
Le	  Plan	  Monnet,	  op.cit.,	  91	  and,	  in	  a	  footnote,	  Andrew	  Shennan,	  Rethinking	  France:	  Plans	  for	  
Renewal	  1940-­‐1946	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1989),	  248.	  
36	  ‘Note	  pour	  le	  Général	  de	  Gaulle’	  by	  Palewski,	  13	  December	  1945,	  3	  AG	  4	  55,	  AN.	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parties, [who would] act in the best interest of the population’.37  Of more direct importance 
was the development of France’s new constitution, which was being drafted in January 1946 
by a committee of parliamentarians from the three governing political parties.  The emerging 
constitution favoured a strong parliament, and de Gaulle blamed the PCF for weakening the 
main powers of the President of the Republic, reducing it to ‘a protocol office and practically 
nothing else’.38  For de Gaulle, a weak executive would result in a loss of not only personal 
but national power and prestige.  By mid-January 1946, Palewski was confiding to the Amer-
ican ambassador in Paris that ‘General de Gaulle may give up his office in view of the ma-
neuvers of Communists and others in and out of the Assembly’.39   
It was against this backdrop that one of the most significant modifications to the 
Monnet Plan was made. Although it had been once again confirmed at the end of September 
1945 that any national economic plan would be overseen by the Minister for the National 
Economy, Monnet now insisted that his plan must be independent of any single ministry and 
instead answer directly to the President.  The appeal to de Gaulle was obvious: just as the 
PCF was hollowing out the powers of the President, de Gaulle could now hollow out some of 
the key powers from the economic ministries headed by the PCF.  Beyond being mere tit-for-
tat, this structure would also strengthen the authority of the President who, rather than any 
minister, would oversee the plan.  Finally, Monnet’s argument that France’s grandeur was 
dependent upon the successful implementation of his economic plan elevated the CGP almost 
to a ‘fourth lever’	   of foreign policy.  Just as de Gaulle ensured that the first ‘three levers that 
control [France’s] foreign policy’	   were beyond the control of the PCF, so too did he act to 
shield the plan on which France’s grandeur supposedly depended from control by a Com-
munist minister.   
Monnet’s recourse to anti-Communism and to grandeur to secure de Gaulle’s backing 
begs the question of why the Communist ministers, particularly François Billoux, as Minister 
for the National Economy, similarly endorsed Monnet’s proposal to move the plan beyond 
                                                
37	  ‘Discours	  prononcé	  à	  Bayeux’,	  16	  June	  1946,	  in	  Charles	  de	  Gaulle,	  Discours	  et	  messages.	  
Tome	  2:	  Dans	  l’attente	  (Paris:	  Plon,	  1970),	  10.	  
38	  ‘Telegram	  from	  the	  Ambassador	  in	  France	  (Caffery)	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State’,	  21	  January	  
1946,	  FRUS	  1946,	  volume	  V,	  402-­‐403.	  	  See	  also	  Serge	  Berstein,	  Histoire	  du	  Gaullisme	  (Paris:	  
Perrin,	  2001),	  95-­‐97.	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their control.  One crucial ingredient to Monnet’s success in this respect was his pledge to 
grant workers an important voice in the formulation of the PME.  The targets of the plan were 
to be determined by industry-specific Modernisation Commissions (Commissions de modern-
isation)40 that included workers as well as employers, technicians, and government represent-
atives.41  Such a model fitted neatly with the PCF’s stated aims at the time; at the party’s con-
gress in June 1945, PCF leader Maurice Thorez had proclaimed that ‘the revival of France is 
not the responsibility of a single party or of a handful of statesmen, but millions of French 
men and women’.42  The emphasis on national unity, on the inclusion of workers, and on the 
importance of ‘democracy’ emanating from the PCF in 1945 was certainly not lost on Mon-
net, who labelled the proposed Modernisation Commissions as ‘bodies that are genuinely… 
democratic’ where workers would have a strong voice.43  The idea of bringing together work-
ers and employers to develop industrial targets did not come from the PCF – Monnet attribut-
ed the idea to the development of Working Parties in wartime Britain, while the American 
Robert Nathan, who had been in charge of planning in the War Production Board, similarly 
advised Monnet to adopt such a structure44 – but Monnet was nevertheless able to present it 
in such a way as to appeal to the PCF.  Given the party’s overriding goal in this period of 
                                                                                                                                                  
39	  ‘Telegram	  from	  the	  Ambassador	  in	  France	  (Caffery)	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State’,	  18	  January	  
1946,	  FRUS	  1946,	  volume	  V,	  400-­‐401.	  
40	  Commissions	  de	  modernisation	  were	  established	  for	  each	  of	  France’s	  key	  industries.	  Un-­‐
der	  the	  Monnet	  Plan,	  they	  were	  responsible	  for	  providing	  accurate	  data	  on	  each	  industry	  
and	  for	  helping	  draw	  up	  a	  viable	  production	  programme	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  CGP.	  
41	  In	  his	  memoirs	  covering	  his	  time	  as	  minister,	  Billoux	  points	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  similarly	  
composed	  comités	  d’entreprise	  in	  key	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  PCF.	  	  In-­‐
terestingly,	  he	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  Monnet	  Plan	  whatsoever	  and	  instead	  attributes	  the	  
revival	  of	  French	  industry	  to	  the	  policies	  of	  Communist	  ministers.	  	  See	  Billoux,	  Quand	  nous	  
étions	  ministres,	  op.cit.,	  87-­‐88.	  
42	  Maurice	  Thorez,	  Renaisance,	  démocratie,	  unité.	  Rapport	  du	  Comité	  central	  au	  Xe	  Congrès,	  
V,	  21	  (Paris:	  Editions	  sociales,	  1963),	  99.	  
43	  ‘Simplification	  de	  la	  réglementation	  économique’,	  24	  January	  1946,	  AMF	  1	  6,	  Fondation	  
Jean	  Monnet	  pour	  l’Europe	  (FJME),	  Lausanne.	  
44	  In	  their	  memoirs,	  both	  Monnet	  and	  Hirsch	  attribute	  the	  idea	  of	  this	  structure	  to	  the	  Brit-­‐
ish	  model.	  	  See	  Monnet,	  Mémoires,	  op.cit.,	  342	  and	  Etienne	  Hirsch,	  Ainsi	  va	  la	  vie	  (Lau-­‐
sanne:	  Fondation	  Jean	  Monnet	  pour	  l’Europe,	  1988),	  89.	  	  On	  Nathan’s	  influence,	  see	  Kuisel,	  
Capitalism	  and	  the	  State,	  op.cit.,	  230	  and	  Wells,	  Jean	  Monnet,	  op.cit.,	  98-­‐101.	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contributing to national governments and establishing itself as a genuine party of govern-
ment, the refusal to accept such a project would have posed significant political difficulties.45 
While Monnet’s appeals to democracy and workers’ representation helped convince 
the Communist ministers to accept his plan, the decisive factor was Monnet’s promise that 
the CGP would be merely a temporary office.  According to his December 1945 proposal, the 
CGP would exist for only six months, during which time it would produce the PME; at that 
point, the CGP would be dissolved and the administration of the plan would implicitly be 
returned to the Ministry for the National Economy.  Billoux explicitly stated that his support 
for Monnet’s proposals in December was determined by the ‘temporary nature of the Com-
missariat’.46  Monnet himself acknowledged that the ministers ‘only accepted this method 
because they know that the Commissariat and the Commissions will disappear in six months 
[and] because they consider them to be temporary’.47  Such promises reassured ministers who 
might otherwise have opposed the siphoning of their competences.  As such, the Cabinet en-
dorsed ‘the broad lines of Monsieur Monnet’s memorandum’ on 14 December.48 
Following this approval, de Gaulle formally declared the establishment of the Com-
missariat for the Plan on 3 January 1946.  Reading the decree, it is easy to see how Monnet 
had couched the project in terms certain to entice de Gaulle.  The CGP would operate outside 
the jurisdiction of any partisan minister and would act in accordance with the national inter-
est, while answering directly to the President of the Republic.   Furthermore, having just giv-
en the PCF four economic portfolios, de Gaulle must have been intrigued by Monnet’s plan 
to co-opt the heart of their powers.  The economic development of France would no longer be 
in the hands of a Communist minister seemingly motivated by electoral advantage and alle-
giance to Moscow, but would instead be run by a rational, non-partisan Commissariat doing 
what was best for the nation.  In appealing to de Gaulle amidst the challenges presented by 
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the PCF, Monnet’s supra-ministerial organisation for his plan proved irresistible to the Gen-
eral.  Despite the implicit Gaullist and anti-Communist themes in the decree, it is striking that 
Monnet managed to secure the endorsement of the PCF as well.  The decree similarly con-
tained references to national unity and the involvement of workers, which echoed much of 
the PCF’s own rhetoric at the time.  The decisive factor was Monnet’s assurance that the CGP 
would disappear within a few months, which provided sufficient reassurance to those running 
the economic ministries that their powers were not being co-opted irrevocably.  
 
IV 
While signing the decree creating the CGP was one of de Gaulle’s most significant 
acts of the first weeks of 1946, his involvement by no means ended with his signature on 3 
January.  In a newly discovered document written by Monnet, marked ‘secret’ and addressed 
only to his two closest collaborators, Etienne Hirsch and Robert Marjolin, he informed them 
of the substantial work that had to be completed on an unusually pressing deadline.  The doc-
ument, dated Sunday 13 January, specified that the membership of the Council for the Plan 
would need to be finalised and prepared as an ordinance for de Gaulle to sign by 17 January, 
just four days later.  The former was not too taxing, as Monnet had already drawn up a list of 
a dozen ministers who would be part of the Council, along with Monnet and his staff.49  Far 
more demanding was the requirement that the first five Modernisation Commissions also had 
to be ‘constituted, their presidents chosen and confirmed, [and] their chairmen appointed’ for 
Saturday 19 January.  ‘Jean Monnet must present the constitution of these commissions to 
General de Gaulle for his signature on this date’, with the content of the document to be an-
nounced to the Council for the Plan at its first meeting, scheduled for 21 January.50  In his 
memoirs, Hirsch notes that ‘the proposals we submitted to General de Gaulle became, with-
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out the slightest modification, the instructions given’ to the members of the CGP. 51  The 
haste in which these documents were drawn up is striking, even by the standards of the GPRF 
in the early post-war period. 
 The frantic pace at which the central institutions of the CGP were put together was 
determined quite clearly by a decision that de Gaulle claims in his memoirs he made on 1 
January 1946: to resign as President of the Republic.52  Between de Gaulle’s decree authoris-
ing the creation of the CGP on 3 January and the secret note Monnet wrote on 13 January, the 
two men agreed on a very tight deadline for the essential components of the CGP to be en-
dorsed by, and backed with ordinances from, the President.  It was imperative that these be 
presented to de Gaulle for his signature on 19 January for a very simple reason: the following 
morning he resigned as President.  Thus one of his very final acts as President was the ap-
proval of the establishment of the first Modernisation Commissions, which were then pre-
sented by Monnet to the Council for the Plan the day after de Gaulle’s resignation.  At that 
meeting the Modernisation Commissions were described as ‘the specific and essential appa-
ratus of the whole project’, and they co-opted significant powers from the Ministry for Indus-
trial Production as well as the Ministry for the National Economy.53  De Gaulle’s collabora-
tion with Monnet in the final days before resigning as President thus ensured that the essen-
tial mechanisms of the Monnet Plan – the Commissariat for the Plan, the Council for the 
Plan, and the Modernisation Commissions – would exist outside of any ministry and would 
survive long after the General’s resignation. 
Despite the endorsement of Monnet’s memorandum by the Ministers for the National 
Economy and for Industrial Production in December, it is worth considering to what extent 
Monnet subsequently consulted or even coordinated his actions with these ministries.  In the 
weeks following his appointment on 21 November 1945, Marcel Paul made repeated requests 
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to meet with Monnet to discuss the development of the latter’s plan –	   to no avail.  On 4 De-
cember, two weeks after Paul’s appointment, Monnet sent his proposal for the establishment 
of the plan to de Gaulle; by 13 December de Gaulle had responded with a draft memorandum 
summarising Monnet’s plans, which was endorsed by Billoux and Paul the next day.54  Fol-
lowing that inter-ministerial meeting, Paul requested that Blum-Picard, Secretary General for 
Industrial Production, arrange a meeting between the minister and Monnet.  Despite contin-
ued attempts by Blum-Picard, this meeting never came about.  On 10 January 1946, a week 
after de Gaulle had approved the creation of the CGP, details of the project including a de-
scription of the Modernisation Commissions were made public.  Yet by 18 January Blum-
Picard was still unable to organise any meeting between Monnet and Paul.  A clearly riled 
Blum-Picard informed the minister that Monnet ‘seem[ed] to systematically evade any meet-
ing with’ either Blum-Picard or Paul.55  Of course we know that on 18 January Monnet was 
scrambling to finalise the various ordinances that de Gaulle would have to sign the following 
day.  Interestingly, once having received the support of the PCF ministers in December, 
Monnet proceeded to elaborate the framework of the PME while methodically avoiding any 
kind of meeting with them.  Marcel Paul and François Billoux were two of the 12 ministers 
who attended the first meeting of the Council for the Plan on 21 January, and it was only then 
that they were briefed on the latest developments in the Monnet Plan.    
Following de Gaulle’s dramatic resignation, Socialist Félix Gouin was named his suc-
cessor as President of the Republic.  In his very first meeting with Monnet after succeeding 
de Gaulle, Gouin informed Monnet that he planned to modify the statute of the CGP by at-
taching it to the Ministry for the National Economy.  This had, after all, been the consensus 
the previous summer, before Communist François Billoux was given the portfolio and the 
subsequent supra-ministerial structure of the CGP was devised.  Yet the political situation 
had changed somewhat following de Gaulle’s departure.  When forming his first government, 
Gouin gave the portfolio for the National Economy to fellow Socialist André	   Philip, who 
replaced Billoux on 26 January.  Philip had joined de Gaulle in London in 1942 and spent 
much of the war studying questions of industrial organisation, making him an obvious candi-
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date for overseeing the country’s economic planning.56  With the ministry in seemingly safe 
hands, returning the plan there, as had been the initial intention, could certainly be seen as a 
sensible choice.  If anti-Communism had helped to convince de Gaulle to move the plan be-
yond the reach of a Communist Minister for the National Economy, such an argument no 
longer applied when the President and the Minister for the National Economy belonged to the 
same party.   
Determined to maintain the recently won supra-ministerial character of the CGP, 
Monnet took a different approach to convince Gouin.  He unequivocally told the new Presi-
dent that attaching the CGP to the ministry would be ‘a mistake that would compromise the 
success of the whole undertaking’.  He justified his position on the grounds that ‘it is always 
bad to modify the conditions in which a project operates once it is already underway’.57  Such 
an argument was rather shaky, as barely a month had elapsed since the decree first establish-
ing the CGP, but it is indicative of Monnet’s approach.  Indeed, Monnet went so far as to 
write a letter of resignation to Gouin to dissuade the President from placing the CGP under 
the authority of the Ministry for the National Economy.  Faced with this ultimatum, Gouin 
backed down and, in June of that year, was succeeded as President by Georges Bidault of the 
MRP.  Just as Gouin had done, Bidault swiftly appointed one of his own party colleagues, in 
this case François de Menthon, as Minister for the National Economy.  The fact that the first 
six months of the year saw this portfolio change hands from a Communist to a Socialist to a 
Christian Democrat does indeed give weight to Monnet’s insistence on ‘placing the CGP 
above these [partisan] polemics’.58  Besides the justification of the Commissariat’s structure, 
this episode demonstrates Monnet’s strategy in creating the CGP, namely rushing the plans 
so that they could be signed into law by de Gaulle just before his resignation, then defending 
the status quo against reforms by his successor.  It proved to be successful and ensured the 
survival of Monnet’s preferred structure for the PME.59 
Monnet’s response to Gouin’s proposal marks the first sign that Monnet was already 
looking to renegue on the promise that had ensured the successful creation of the supra-
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ministerial CGP in the first place: that it would disappear within six months and would then 
be succeeded by the Ministry for the National Economy.  Just five days after writing to 
Gouin, Monnet acknowledged that the Cabinet ‘only accepted [Monnet’s proposals] because 
they consider them [the CGP and the Modernisation Commissions] to be temporary… and, 
once again, that this does not affect the future shape of the administration’.60  By April, how-
ever, Monnet insisted that ‘it is necessary to maintain the Council for the Plan and the Mod-
ernisation Commissions and to give them permanent status’.61  To achieve this goal Monnet 
threatened to resign yet again – this time in January 1947 to then premier Léon Blum.  Blum 
acquiesced and on 16 January 1947 decreed the permanent institutionalisation of the CGP, 
despite the protests of André Philip and the Ministry for the National Economy.  As with de 
Gaulle’s decree twelve months earlier, the decision was not debated in the National Assembly 
but was instead authorised by decree.  Interestingly, both decrees barely preceded the respec-
tive leaders’ resignations: Blum himself resigned later the same day just hours after signing 
the decree.  This high turnover of governments and ministers contrasts markedly with the 
relative stability of the CGP where Monnet remained firmly in charge. 
It is worth considering Monnet’s own motivations for defending and entrenching the 
CGP’s supra-ministerial position.  According to Monnet’s own account in his memoirs, he 
proposed this structure because he genuinely believed that France needed its industry to be 
overseen by a benevolent and thoroughly non-partisan group of experts, rather than by a min-
istry whose fundamental direction could change according to the caprice of the electorate.62  
A less generous interpretation would be that he was motivated by the simple desire to secure 
the widest possible jurisdiction over French industry for himself.63  In either case, Monnet 
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was clearly preoccupied with having the plan under his own control, beyond the supervision 
of any minister and answerable only to the Head of the Government.  He was certainly open-
ly critical of the Ministry for the National Economy’s failure to put together a plan by the end 
of 1945, and argued that his nimble CGP, with a staff of only a few dozen, would be more 
effective than the cumbersome economic ministries.  Indeed, the flurry of activity accom-
plished by Monnet and his closest associates the week prior to de Gaulle’s resignation – at a 
pace that a large ministry likely could not have rivalled – demonstrates the advantage of the 
CGP’s structure.  While Monnet seems to have used anti-Communism as a factor to sway de 
Gaulle, it does not in itself explain Monnet’s attachment to the CGP’s supra-ministerial struc-
ture, as his refusal to allow non-Communist ministers to take over the plan demonstrates. 
 The international context and particularly his dealings with the United State undoubt-
edly influenced Monnet’s thinking in this direction as well.  In early March 1946 Monnet was 
sent to Washington to negotiate a major loan from the United States, funds which were nec-
essary to bankroll Monnet’s ambitious plan to re-equip and modernise French industry.  By 
this time, he had developed a draft PME which helped convince the Americans that the 
French government was serious about modernising its economy and that the loan would be 
well spent.  In May 1946, Monnet managed to secure a loan for $650 million, known as the 
Blum-Byrnes agreement, ‘to facilitate the restoration, the reconstruction, and the modernisa-
tion of the French Economy’.64  It must be remembered that Monnet’s first conversation 
about economic planning with de Gaulle in August 1945 had focused chiefly on how to se-
cure American dollars to revive the French economy.  The Blum-Byrnes agreement marked a 
crucial step in realising this goal, and one that had been facilitated by the supra-ministerial 
architecture developed by Monnet under de Gaulle.65   
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This analysis of the creation of the Monnet Plan allows us to reassess several key ar-
guments which pervade the historiography.  First, the Ministry for the National Economy’s 
involvement in developing a plan for the French economy did not end with the resignation of 
Pierre Mendès France, as it is widely held.  Rather, drawing up such a plan remained part of 
the ministry’s responsibilities, and the ministry was reorganised after Mendès France’s depar-
ture to facilitate such a task.  The fact that these arrangements were confirmed on the eve of 
the legislative elections in October 1945, and that no mention of a supra-ministerial office 
responsible for planning was made prior to these elections, reveal that the impetus for creat-
ing a CGP independent of any ministry was indeed the result of those elections.  Only once 
the Ministry for the National Economy as well as the other economic portfolios were given to 
members of the PCF did the notion of a supra-ministerial planning office surface. 
This raises questions about Monnet’s explanation, upheld in the literature on the 
Monnet Plan, that this unprecedented creation of a supra-ministerial office to oversee the 
development of a national economic plan came about simply for the sake of efficiency.  Ra-
ther, as has been shown, this arrangement was only proposed after the economic ministries 
had been taken up by Communists.  For de Gaulle, support for such a supra-ministerial struc-
ture had little to do with economic considerations or questions of institutional efficiency.  Just 
as the General had sided with Pleven over Mendès France in early 1945 for political rather 
than economic reasons, his support for Monnet’s proposals was determined by their political 
utility.  The prospect advanced by Monnet of having a powerful, non-partisan Commissariat 
acting with only the national interest in mind to organise French industry could hardly have 
been more appealling to the anti-Communist de Gaulle, particularly once Monnet added that 
only by reviving the national economy could France secure and sustain its international 
standing as a great power.  Furthermore, the prospect of co-opting important responsibilities 
from PCF ministers – at the very time that de Gaulle perceived their party to be trying to 
weaken his office – made Monnet’s proposals more alluring still.  While Monnet himself was 
not vocally anti-Communist, he clearly had no reservations with using this line of argument 
to convince de Gaulle to endorse a supra-ministerial CGP.  And his strategy worked. As 
Monnet later recalled, ‘General de Gaulle followed my recommendations entirely [from] the 
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structure of the Plan [to] the place it would occupy in the political and administrative life of 
the country’.66 
While this demonstrates Monnet’s shrewd skills of persuasion, his proposals were on-
ly endorsed by Cabinet because of his equally dexterous recourse to a different set of argu-
ments.  While he made use of anti-Communist feelings to convince de Gaulle, he managed to 
sway the Communist ministers holding the economic portfolios by emphasising the demo-
cratic nature of the CGP’s Modernisation Commissions and the extent of worker involvement 
in the drafting of the PME.  This ability to tailor his argument to align with the ideological 
preoccupations of different actors lies at the heart of Monnet’s astonishing success at achiev-
ing wide-ranging consensus in favour of a supra-ministerial CGP charged with producing the 
PME.  While Monnet’s abilities as a consensus builder are widely acknowledged in the litera-
ture, he is nearly always celebrated as ‘open[…] and honest’.67  Yet it has been shown here 
that the endorsement of the CGP by the Minister for the National Economy and his col-
leagues in the PCF was only secured with a good measure of duplicity.  Monnet promised the 
ministers that the CGP would be merely a temporary creation, charged with speedily putting 
together a wide-ranging plan with input from all interested parties, notably workers.  This 
assurance that the CGP would then disappear within six months of its creation, with respon-
sibilities for the PME then reverting to the relevant economic ministries, was explicitly iden-
tified by both Billoux and Monnet as the condition upon which the PCF ministers approved 
the creation of the CGP.  Yet from the moment the CGP was authorised by de Gaulle’s decree 
in January 1946, Monnet sought to defend its existence tooth-and-nail.  While his threat to 
Gouin in February against transferring the CGP to the Ministry for the National Economy is 
understandable, given that this would have reduced the supra-ministerial arrangement to only 
one month instead of six, it is clear that Monnet sought to entrench the supposedly transitory 
structure well beyond its intended shelf-life.  Barely three months after the creation of the 
CGP and the first Modernisation Commissions, Monnet began to insist that these offices 
must be made permanent.  Thanks to his powers of persuasion, bolstered by repeated threats 
to resign, Monnet managed to have the lifespan of the CGP extended and ultimately institu-
tionalised permanently in January 1947.  While Monnet’s motivations seem to have been no-
ble throughout this period – he genuinely believed that a supra-ministerial CGP was far more 
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efficient than the Ministry for the National Economy, regardless of the political stripe of the 
minister – his method of building a consensus on promises which he subsequently broke re-
veals a more nuanced picture of Monnet, at odds with his established image as an open and 
honest broker. 
Two months after Blum’s decree rendering the CGP permanent, recurrent minister 
Albert Gazier described the state of ‘relations between the CGP and the ministries’ as ‘not 
very good […] indeed, downright bad’.68  He surmised that the situation could only be im-
proved by the ‘constitution of a veritable Ministry for the National Economy’ with control 
over the CGP, but that because of ‘the personalities involved this solution is not possible for 
now’.69  Indeed, as long as Monnet remained at the head of the CGP, this option proved im-
possible. Following Monnet’s departure from the CGP in August 1952 and his replacement 
by his close colleague Etienne Hirsch, however, the supra-ministerial position of the CGP 
came under threat.  In June 1954, a new government was formed by Pierre Mendès France.  
Just as Mendès France had argued a decade earlier for the necessity of a strong economics 
ministry responsible for planning, his views remained unchanged upon taking office.  Barely 
one month after being named as Head of Government, Mendès France extended the responsi-
bilities of the economics portfolio, appointing Edgar Faure as Minister for Finance, Econom-
ic Affairs, and the Plan.  Henceforth Hirsch worked under the tutelage of this economics min-
istry, a fate Monnet had adamantly and successfully avoided.70  Economic planning thus re-
turned to the Ministry for the National Economy, as it had been until the pivotal legislative 
elections of October 1945. 
Monnet’s departure from the CGP was prompted by a project even more audacious 
than the PME. In May 1950, Monnet and then Foreign Minister Robert Schuman launched 
the Schuman Plan which sought to pool the French and German coal and steel industries.  
This resulted, in 1952, in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
the first supra-national institution in Europe and the forerunner to the European Union.  Jean 
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Monnet was unanimously chosen as President of the ECSC’s executive, the High Authority, 
prompting his resignation from the CGP.  The above re-evaluation of the Monnet Plan also 
reveals important similarities with the establishment of the ECSC. The appeal of the CGP had 
been to place vital components of the economy in the hands of a purportedly apolitical office 
staffed with experts and responsible to the executive rather than to any minister.  This ar-
rangement was justified on the grounds that Monnet and the CGP would act in the national 
interest, remaining above any partisan wrangling between ministers.  Monnet adopted a simi-
lar approach when developing the architecture of the the ECSC: at the European level, Mon-
net insisted upon a supra-national High Authority that was meant to pursue the interests of 
the Community as a whole, above any potentially obstructionist national leader.71  Monnet 
again employed his remarkable skills of persuasion among politicians and stakeholders from 
the six founding members of the ECSC to institute the forerunner to today’s European Un-
ion.72 While the supra-ministerial design of the CGP did not survive for long after Monnet’s 
departure, it informed the supra-national structure of the European institutions which has 
been maintained ever since.  
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